Defining Metabolic Syndrome: what kind of causality, if any, is required? by Benzi, Margherita
Disputatio, Vol. IX, No. 47, December 2017
Received: 05/09/2017 Accepted: 02/11/2017
© 2017 Benzi. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Defining Metabolic Syndrome:
Which Kind of Causality, if any,
is Required?
Margherita Benzi
University of Eastern Piedmont
BIBLID [0873-626X (2017) 47; pp. 553–580]
DOI: 10.1515/disp-2017-0018
Abstract
The definition of metabolic syndrome (MetS) has been, and still is, 
extremely controversial. My purpose is not to give a solution to the as-
sociated debate but to argue that the controversy is at least partially due 
to the different ‘causal content’ of the various definitions: their theo-
retical validity and practical utility can be evaluated by reconstruct-
ing or making explicit the underlying causal structure. I will therefore 
propose to distinguish the alternative definitions according to the kinds 
of causal content they carry: (1) definitions grounded on associations, 
(2) definitions presupposing a causal model built upon statistical as-
sociations, and (3) definitions grounded on underlying mechanisms. I 
suggest that analysing definitions according to their causal content can 
be helpful in evaluating alternative definitions of some diseases. I want 
to show how the controversy over MetS suggests a distinction among 
three kinds of definitions based on how explicitly they characterise the 
syndrome in causal terms, and on the type of causality involved. I will 
call ‘type 1 definitions’ those definitions that are purely associative; 
‘type 2 definitions’ the definitions based on statistical associations, 
plus generic medical and causal knowledge; and ‘type 3 definitions’ 
the definitions based on (hypotheses about) mechanisms. These kinds 
of definitions, although different, can be related to each other. A defi-
nition with more specific causal content may be useful in the evalua-
tion of definitions characterised by a lower degree of causal specificity. 
Moreover, the identification of the type of causality involved is of help 
to constitute a good criterion for choosing among different definitions 
of a pathological entity.
In section (1) I introduce the controversy about MetS, in section (2) I 
propose some remarks about medical definitions and their ‘causal im-
port’, and in section (3) I suggest that the different attitudes towards 
the definition of MetS are relevant to evaluate their explicative power.
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1 A short historical survey on metabolic syndrome
The debate on the notion of metabolic syndrome (MetS), a now 
ubiquitous topic in both scientific literature and the media, began 
in late 1980s and reached a peak in the first decade of this century. 
Given that the topic of MetS is still highly debated, I will restrict the 
short historical survey to the period in which the conflict among 
definitions is particularly strong and methodologically explicit. This 
narrower historical focus helps to show that the controversy over 
the definitions of MetS is interwoven with some classical problems in 
the philosophy of medicine, mainly whether definitions must have a 
causal import or how to understand causality in this context.
1.1 The rise of metabolic syndrome
MetS has long been known as a constellation of factors that put in-
dividuals at risk of developing two relevant pathologies: type 2 dia-
betes (T2D) and cardiovascular disease (CVD). In addition, MetS 
has been recognised as an important risk factor in other pathologies, 
such as non-alcoholic fatty liver disease, polycystic ovary syndrome, 
obstructive sleep apnea, sexual dysfunction, and some kinds of can-
cer, particularly colon, prostate, and breast cancers. According to 
the International Diabetes Federation (IDF), a quarter of the world’s 
adults have MetS (see www. idf.org/metabolic-syndrome). Not only 
is MetS so often in the public eye that the media describe it as the 
21st-century plague, but—as a rapid search on PubMed can easily 
testify—it is also the source of an impressive number of scientific 
publications in the biomedical and health areas.
Despite its (sinister) fame, in the first decade of this century, 
MetS has been one of the most controversial notions of biomedical 
ontology. On the one hand, there is a shared agreement on the exis-
tence of MetS (or of some cognate notion); on the other hand, there is 
almost no agreement on its constitutive elements, its structure, how 
to diagnose it, who exactly suffers from it, and its causal role relative 
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to its presumed complications. This and the following section con-
tain an overview of the history of MetS; the focus is on the period 
1988–2010, when the temperature of the debate reached its peak.
In 1761 the Italian anatomist G.B. Morgagni described in his book 
De sedibus et causis morborum per anatomen indagati an association of ab-
dominal obesity and hypertension, hyperuricemia, atherosclerosis, 
and obstructive sleep apnea (see Enzi et al. 2003). After the First 
World War, two Austrian physicians, K. Hitzenberger and M. Rich-
ter-Quittner (1921), published their laboratory observations, which 
suggested a link between hypertension and diabetes mellitus. Other 
results were published by the Spanish doctor G. Marañon (1922) and 
by the Swedish physician E. Kylin (1921, 1923); the latter described 
a clustering of hypertension, hyperglycaemia, and gout. In 1947, J. 
Vague published his observations on the so-called android, or male, 
or apple-shaped obesity, noticing that this form of obesity is associat-
ed with the metabolic abnormalities often seen with T2D and CVD. 
The term ‘metabolic syndrome’ was introduced in 1975 by Haller 
and Hanefeld while studying risk factors of atherosclerosis. Kisse-
bah et al. (1982) reported that upper-body obesity in women offered 
an important prognostic marker for glucose intolerance, hyperinsu-
linemia, and hypertriglyceridemia, and Fujioka et al. (1987) distin-
guished between visceral fat obesity and subcutaneous fat obesity.
The contributions quoted above are generally considered as the 
prehistory of MetS. Most authors set the official date of the birth of 
the syndrome in 1988, when an American endocrinologist, Gerald 
Reaven, proposed to call ‘Syndrome X’ a list of phenotypic abnor-
malities, whose clustering appeared to be predictive of T2D (Reaven 
1988). The components of Syndrome X were the following:
 (a) Resistance to insulin-stimulated glucose uptake;
(b) Impaired glucose tolerance;
(c) Hyperinsulinemia;
(d) Increased VLDL (= very-low-density-lipoprotein) triglycerides;




In his paper, Reaven suggests that insulin resistance1 (a) plays a fun-
damental role in the pathogenesis of coronary artery disease (CAD) 
through various associations with (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), where (f) 
can in turn causally depend on (a) and (c). The hypothesised causal 
relations among the variables are tested by experimental manipula-
tions of rats, or by observations of patients. For instance, Reaven 
(1988: 602) provides experimental evidence that the association of 
insulin resistance (a), glucose intolerance (b), and hyperinsulinemia 
(c) is characteristic of a certain patients with hypertension (f); the 
dependency, in these patients, of hypertension on (a), (b), and (c) 
is supported by the observation that ‘these abnormalities of glucose 
and insulin metabolism do not necessarily improve when hyperten-
sion is controlled by commonly used pharmacological approaches to 
lower blood pressure’. Further experimental evidence is provided 
by the fact that ‘hypertension can be produced in normal rats by 
an experimental manipulation known to induce insulin resistance 
and hyperinsulinemia’ (Reaven 1988: 1604). Insulin resistance is the 
precipitator of Syndrome X: 
The common feature of the proposed Syndrome is insulin resistance, 
and all other changes are likely to be secondary on this basic abnormal-
ity. All five of the proposed consequences of insulin resistance have 
been shown to increase the risk of CAD, and the fact that all of them 
may not necessarily be seen in the same individual should not minimize 
their importance (Reaven 1988: 1606).
Since the introduction of Syndrome X, there has been considerable 
new information on the role of insulin resistance in increasing the 
risk of polycystic ovary syndrome, non-alcoholic fatty liver disease, 
certain forms of cancer, and sleep apnea. These findings induced 
Reaven to expand the list of abnormalities linked to insulin resis-
tance and to call the new list ‘insulin resistance syndrome’ or ‘IR 
syndrome’ (Reaven 2004).




After Reaven’s 1988 contribution, a plethora of definitions was pro-
vided (see Lam and LeRoith 2015). In the same year, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) produced a working definition of 
MetS. The definition required having impaired glucose tolerance, 
impaired fasting glucose or diabetes mellitus, and/or insulin resis-
tance together with two or more additional components. The addi-
tional components were microalbuminuria, hypertension, high tri-
glycerides, low HDL, and central obesity (defined by means of either 
body mass index or waist-to-hip ratio). The definition also included a 
quantitative specification of the last four components.
Due to various critiques, some of which were of a practical na-
ture, the European Group for the Study of Insulin Resistance (EGIR) 
modified the WHO definition in order to simplify the diagnosis 
(Balkau and Charles 1999); the new definition included obesity but 
not albuminuria. Additional definitions were provided by the Nation-
al Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP), which elaborated a ver-
sion called ATP (Adult Treatment Panel) III (ATP III 2001). In 2005 
the IDF consensus definition (Alberti et al. 2005, IDF 2005) includ-
ed central obesity and excluded insulin resistance, while a revision of 
the NCEP definition by the American Heart Association (AHA) and 
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institution (NHLBI) did not 
include abdominal obesity as a necessary component of MetS.
The definitions continued to proliferate, with many ‘regional’ 
versions, leading many authors to question the very existence of the 
syndrome (see Mitka 2005). Then in 2009 a large group of medical 
institutions elaborated a common ‘Worldwide Consensus Statement’ 
(Alberti et al. 2009). The statement endorsed the AHA/NHLBI cri-
teria, but the cut-off points of waist circumference were not deter-
mined for any particular ethnic group (see Oda 2012).
The overabundance of definitions by health institutions was criti-
cized (but also involuntary stimulated) by the American Diabetes 
Association (ADA) and the European Association for the Study of 
Diabetes (EASD), which published a joint statement that conclud-
ed that MetS had been imprecisely defined. The statement advised 
physicians not to label patients with the term ‘metabolic syndrome’ 
in order to avoid creating the false impression that the syndrome 
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denotes a greater risk than its components or that the underlying 
pathophysiology is clear (Kahn et al. 2005).
Unsurprisingly, Reaven maintained a position close to that of the 
ADA and EASD, and in many writings he carefully distinguished his 
‘Syndrome X’ from ‘metabolic syndrome’. Reaven opposed the term 
‘metabolic syndrome’ because many factors of Syndrome X, unlike 
most definitions of MetS, had a clear pathophysiological grounding.2 
Within Reaven’s framework, obesity is not included among the com-
ponents of the syndrome, because, despite its recognised association 
with T2D and CVD, it does not play any recognisable causal role. Syn-
drome X and the subsequent IR syndrome are grounded on a mecha-
nistic view where insulin resistance is a common cause of the disease, 
whereas the definitions of MetS given by the various panellists are 
grounded on statistical associations and are pragmatically conceived 
as a tool to implement a healthy lifestyle (Reaven 2004: 297).
Reaven criticised the panellists’ definitions of MetS in many ar-
ticles, one of which had a transparently critical title (‘The Metabolic 
Syndrome: Requiescat in Pace’, 2005). In a 2006 article, in which the 
diagnostic value of MetS is further criticised, Reaven once again 
stigmatises what he considers the main weak point of the panellists’ 
definitions of MetS: their inability to select a common cause for the 
clustering factors composing the syndrome. But was Reaven right in 
2 In Reaven’s own words: ‘Sensitivity to insulin-mediated glucose disposal 
varies widely in the population at large ... . When insulin-resistant individuals 
cannot maintain the degree of hyperinsulinemia needed to overcome the insulin 
resistance, type 2 diabetes develops ... . Most individuals are able to sustain the 
level of compensatory hyperinsulinemia needed to maintain normal or near nor-
mal glucose tolerance, however. Unfortunately, this philanthropic effort on the 
part of the pancreatic beta cell is a mixed blessing. Although the compensatory 
hyperinsulinemia prevents the development of frank hyperglycaemia, insulin-re-
sistant/hyperinsulinemic individuals are at greatly increased risk of having some 
degree of glucose intolerance, a high plasma triglyceride and low high-density 
lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C) concentration, and essential hypertension ... . 
In 1988 ... , it was proposed that individuals who displayed this cluster of abnor-
malities associated with insulin resistance/compensatory hyperinsulinemia were 
at significantly increased risk of cardiovascular disease (CVD). Because the im-
portance of insulin resistance and associated abnormalities as CVD risk factors 
was not widely appreciated at that time, the cluster of related abnormalities was 
subsumed under the rubric of syndrome X’ (Reaven 2004: 283).
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criticising the notion of MetS on these grounds? why, and to what 
extent, should considerations about causality mix with taxonomical 
questions? I will examine the matter in the following sections.
2 The causal content of the definition
In this and the following sections, I consider three possible approach-
es to the definition of MetS, characterised by different degrees of 
causality and different conceptions of causality. Here I call ‘type 1 
definitions’ those definitions of MetS that are formulated and justified 
independently of causal considerations and are grounded mainly on 
associations of properties. ‘Type 2 definitions’ find their justification 
in being associated to a causal model grounded on statistical data. 
‘Type 3 definitions’ reflect a different approach to causality, since they 
require an associated pathophysiological mechanism that links the 
various components of the syndrome. In the following sections, I 
will specify the utility, aims, and functions of the three kinds of defi-
nitions, and I will analyze their epistemic benefits.
2.1 Causally neutral definitions (type 1)
In what follows, I will consider the causal content of three defini-
tions of MetS, given respectively by ATP III (2001), IDF (2005), and 
WHO (Alberti and Zimmet 1988). I will then compare the three 
definitions with the ‘parallel’ definition of Syndrome X by Reaven.
ATP III defined MetS as any combination of at least three out of 
five factors (briefly, elevated waist circumference, elevated triglycer-
ides, reduced HDL cholesterol, elevated blood pressure, and elevated 
fasting glucose level). As the criteria are not subdivided into ‘neces-
sary’ and ‘accessory’, ATP III is considered the most ‘democratic’3 
of the definitions of MetS. This character can be explained by the 
fact that the proponents of the definition are sceptical about the pos-
sibility of discovering a unique common cause for the clustering of 
the factors. In a conjoined AHA/NHLBI Scientific Statement on the 
diagnosis and management of MetS, Grundy et al. state:
3 See Reaven 2006: 1239.
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At present, it is not clear whether the metabolic syndrome has a single 
cause, and it appears that it can be precipitated by multiple underly-
ing risk factors. The most important of these underlying risk factors are 
abdominal obesity and insulin resistance. Other associated conditions 
include physical inactivity, aging, hormonal imbalance, and genetic or 
ethnic disposition (Grundy et al. 2006: 1).
Unsurprisingly, given the heterogeneity of the risk factors and as-
sociated conditions, in the conclusions they remark that ‘it is rec-
ognized that the metabolic syndrome is a complex disorder, with no 
single factor as the cause’ (Grundy et al. 2006: 5).
The WHO and the IDF definitions take different approaches in 
the selection of an essential criterion, even if its causal role is not 
completely clear. The WHO definition requires that the patient has 
one of the following conditions: diabetes mellitus, impaired glucose 
tolerance, impaired fasting glucose, or insulin resistance. Addition-
ally, the patient must exhibit two of the following conditions: elevate 
waist-to-hip ratio, elevate triglycerides, and microalbuminuria. In 
this definition, the role of insulin resistance as a possible underlying 
common cause is recognised, as the factors in the first category are 
more important and provide evidence in favour of insulin resistance, 
but there is no indication of a causal mechanism.4
The IDF definition also attributes different importance to fac-
tors, but here the fundamental criterion is abdominal obesity; in ad-
dition, two of the following factors are required: elevated triglycer-
ides, reduced HDL cholesterol, high blood pressure, and high fasting 
plasma glucose. In the definitions given by panellists, we can find a 
descriptive approach, where there is no specific search for the causal 
role carried out by each factor. Basically, these definitions state that 
exhibiting a certain number of properties recognised as constitutive 
elements of the ‘syndrome’ is associated with an increased risk of 
certain pathologies.
Federspil et al. (2006) were the first to stress the philosophi-
cal interest of the controversy. They remark that a long tradition in 
4 ‘Evidence is accumulating that insulin resistance may be the common etio-
logical factor for the individual components of the Metabolic Syndrome, although 
there appear to be heterogeneity in the strength of the insulin resistance relation-
ship with different components between, and even within populations’ (Alberti 
and Zimmet 1998: 548).
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medical studies distinguishes between nominal and real definitions: 
according to von Zimmerman (1763), the former points to illness on 
the bases of clinical phenomena, whereas the latter reveals the true 
nature of the illnesses and is based on ‘the knowledge of the relative 
causes’ (see Federspil et al. 2006: 449). In modern medicine, the 
distinction is restated as the contraposition between extensive or nomi-
nal definitions, whose goal is to pick up the patients corresponding to 
a given category, and real definitions, which are intended to explain 
which is the object—the kind of disease—referred to by the name. 
Roughly, nominal definitions correspond to my type 1 definitions, as 
they denote just an association of pathological phenomena that occurs 
with a higher frequency than we would have expected if the phenom-
ena under observation were independent (see Federspil et al. 2006: 
452). Real definitions correspond to my type 3 definitions: ‘When, on 
the other hand, the metabolic syndrome is defined by proposing a 
pathogenetic mechanism that explains the association between vari-
ous illnesses, this means giving it a real causal definition’ (ibid.)
Federspil et al. (2006: 449) claim that if the term ‘metabolic syn-
drome’ denotes merely the association of some metabolic disorders, 
then its utility is restricted to the identification of a certain category 
of patients. This would be exactly an example of a ‘nominal’ defini-
tion in contrast with ‘real’ definitions. According to these authors, 
nominal definitions are legitimate in clinical medicine, ‘an applied 
science that sets out not only to discover, but also to organize in-
complete knowledge for clearly practical purposes’ (Federspil et al. 
2006: 554). However, in the specific case of MetS, they point to 
some problems that put into question a too easy generalisation of the 
very utility of nominal definitions.
As their objections are closely related to those presented by other 
authors (such as Reaven and Kahn) that I will discuss later, I give here 
a general exposition of three main critical remarks about nominal or 
type 1 definitions of MetS:
(a) Concerning the case of MetS, the diagnostic utility of a mere 
list of predictive factors brings about what we could call an 
instability of reference, which is instability on the class of indi-
viduals to whom we can attribute the property ‘affected by 
metabolic syndrome’.
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(b) If for ‘practical utility’ we mean not only ‘predictive utility’ 
but also utility for prevention, treatment, therapy, and public 
health care planning, then the list of factors must point out 
not only the individual factors but also the conjunction of the 
components. Therefore, the definition should find a justifica-
tion in some kind of unifying treatment that is more effica-
cious than the treatment of the individual components (taken 
one by one).
(c) If such a requirement appears too onerous, we should at least 
require that a multi-factor definition such as the MetS has a 
practical utility to efficaciously remind doctors and patients 
which parameters should be monitored to prevent future dis-
eases. However, this minimalistic and purely psychological 
rendering of the syndrome requires a justification that shows 
that the definition is more efficacious than other parameters 
and, at the same time, does not cut off relevant factors.
I will discuss the topic of practical utility in the next section; in what 
follows, I will try to give some examples of the negative consequenc-
es of the instability of reference.
As we have seen, many institutions or panels (WHO, EGIR, ATP 
III, and others) have proposed different definitions intended as diag-
nostic tools, mainly as sets of risk factors for T2D and CVD. How-
ever, the different definitions are unable to select the same factors 
as necessary and sufficient criteria to label patients as having MetS. 
If, on the other hand, we allow that just a subset of the properties 
characterising MetS are possessed by individuals, we run the risk 
of labelling as ‘MetS patients’ individuals much different from one 
another. It is worth quoting the analysis by Federspil et al. of the 
problem raised by the plurality of definitions of MetS:
If we consider all patients who present the various recognized traits of 
MetS, or if we represent them using Venn’s diagrams, however many 
traits there may be, it can be seen that if only two traits are consid-
ered—for example type 2 diabetes and obesity—then there will be 
just one condition characterized by the presence of both traits. If the 
syndrome’s traits are four and at least three the components needed in 
order to diagnose it, the association that allows diagnosis are five ... 
Now, if we consider that the various definitions of metabolic syndrome 
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consist of at least ten pathological phenomena (hyperglycemia, hyper-
insulinemia, insulin resistance, central obesity, hyperlipidemia, arte-
rial hypertension, microalbuminuria, hyperuricemia, prothrombotic 
and prohinflammatory states), it is easy to understand that the possible 
clinical pictures of the condition are too numerous to be of much help 
in diagnosis or prognosis (Federspil et al. 2006: 453).
What Federspil et al. presented as an abstract hypothesis finds an 
empirical counterpart in an Australian study, called the AusDiab 
Study (see Alberti 2005: D5). Here the different prevalence rates for 
MetS by three of the different definitions referred to above (WHO, 
EGIR, ATP III) are represented with Venn diagrams. It is worth 
noting that not only do the three definitions select slightly different 
percentages of the population as being affected by MetS, but only 
a subpart of the diagnosed ‘patients’ meets the joint criteria for all 
three definitions. Moreover, the most external parts of the chart 
represent non-overlapping groups of ‘patients’.
Figure 1: Percent prevalences within the total population (from Alberti 2005)
By criticising the purely nominal definitions of MetS proposed by 
various panels of experts, Federspil et al. (2006) advocate the search 
for a real definition. They find in the definition of Syndrome X pro-
posed by Reaven (1988) a proper causal definition that appears very 
different from the descriptive definitions proposed by various panels 
of experts. The causal character of Reaven’s definition makes it more 
reliable from both a clinical and a scientific point of view. The defini-
tion selects insulin resistance, but not abdominal obesity, as a neces-
sary component of the syndrome and, at the same time, as the start-
ing point for the construction of a pathophysiological mechanism 
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that explains the syndrome. On the other hand, if we follow other 
definitions and take—as a necessary component of the syndrome—
abdominal obesity, but not insulin resistance, the syndrome should 
be considered as pointing to a different pathogenic mechanism, and 
therefore to a different disease (Federspil et al. 2006: 454).
Federspil et al. point out that Reaven’s definition of Syndrome X 
is different from the definitions of panellists, because Syndrome X is 
endowed with causal import and is founded on a precise pathophysi-
ological hypothesis. However, the association of a precise patho-
physiological mechanism is not necessary for the attribution of ca-
sual import to a definition or for its being only a classificatory tool. 
Actually, a definition could be associated to a causal structure not 
grounded on a precise mechanism, but of a different kind, as the 
causal structures of graphical causal models. In this case, we would 
have a ‘type 2 definition’. Even if, to my knowledge, nobody has pre-
sented a detailed graphical causal model (DAG-based) as an explicit 
definition of MetS in the period we are considering, I think this ap-
proach is worth discussing with respect to the definition of MetS. In 
fact, as we will see in the next section, on the one hand, Bayesian 
nets have been explicitly considered with respect to this topic; on the 
other, some of the problems linked to causal modelling—such as the 
relation between statistical data and back ground theoretical knowl-
edge—play a crucial role in the discussion about MetS.
2.2 Type 2 definitions: causal modelling
It is worth remarking that, concerning the definition of MetS, the 
plurality of definitions and the consequent vagueness of the notion 
of MetS are considered not only a theoretical problem, but also and 
mainly a practical problem, casting doubts on the applicability of such 
a notion in diagnostic and therapeutic practices. The need for a more 
precise definition of MetS is strongly felt in the medical community, 
and many papers published at the beginning of the 21st century tes-
tify to this.5 But which kind of definition is needed? Medical sciences 
5 Here are some: Leśniak and Kolasińska-Kloch 2003, Lim et al. 2004, 
Jørgensen and Borch-Johnsen 2004, Real and Carmena 2005, Rosas Peralta 
2005, Eschwège 2005, Liberopoulos and Elisaf 2005, Aguilar-Salinas et al. 2005.
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do not strictly require definitions expressed as a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Kincaid (2008) has noted that research on can-
cer makes progress notwithstanding the fact that there is no precise 
definition of the cancerous cell and that the expression ‘cancer’ is 
related to very different pathological phenomena. He also remarks 
that the difficulty of giving a precise definition of depression does 
not entail the non-existence of the pathology (Kincaid 2008: 375).
We are then back to the apparently weaker pragmatic stance ac-
cording to which the definitions of panellists are of ‘practical utility’ 
(see the previous section at points (b) and (c)). But those definitions 
often reveal a hidden tension: on the one hand, they appear to be 
mere ‘nominal’ definitions linked only to practical utility; on the 
other hand, they hint at unknown causes underlying statistical asso-
ciations and therefore seem to assume a non-specified underlying set 
of interacting causal factors. In what follows, I will try to explore 
this suggestion and see what result we may gain, if any.
The definitions given by panellists are basically disjunctions of 
conjunctions of properties, where each conjunction is associated to 
an increased probability of certain pathologies. Can we still speak of 
‘mechanisms’ in this context? Well, yes and no. Type 3 definitions, 
such as Reaven’s, aim to give mechanistic explanations of a (pathologi-
cal) phenomenon. Here the term ‘mechanism’ is intended in the sense 
specified by recent research in mechanistic causation, by authors such 
as Machamer, Darden, Craver, Bechtel and Abrahamsen, and Glen-
nan. This notion is efficaciously synthesised by Campaner:
Over and above differences between individual accounts, it can be 
claimed that a mechanism is usually construed as a system composed of 
entities that interact with each other. Entities must be localized and hier-
archically organized within the system. It is not only their presence but 
also the organization of the entities and their activities that determine 
the ways in which they produce the phenomenon (Campaner 2011: 8).
It should be noted that mechanisms of this kind are often, if not 
always, multi-level. But we may also consider a more abstract no-
tion of mechanism, where the ‘mechanism’ is conceived as a set of 
variables and a set of causal relations among variables on the same 
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level6. ‘Mechanisms’ of such a kind are particularly suitable to be 
represented and studied using graphical causal models (Pearl 2000; 
Spirtes et al. 1993). Because the use of the term ‘mechanism’ to de-
note these kinds of causal structures can be misleading,7 I will just 
call them ‘causal structures’. I will call any representation of causal 
structures a ‘causal model’.
The point I want to make is that some of the panellists’ definitions 
of MetS can be interpreted as definitions pointing to causal struc-
tures, either implicit or not fully defined.8 From this viewpoint, 
those definitions would not be merely associational definitions, but 
instead, they would a certain degree of causal import. Here, how-
ever, the kind of causality involved is based on statistical data and 
general principles of causal reasoning, and closer to the graphical 
modelling approach than to the strictly mechanistic one. However, 
in this case, many type II definitions could be criticized not only for 
their inability to select an appropriate class of patients (as it happens 
with nominal definitions), but also for being associated to a causal 
model that, as we shall see, does not adequately represent the real 
causal structure under investigation. In this perspective, most of the 
criticisms against the panellists’ definitions can be interpreted as 
motivated by the inadequacy of the underlying causal models and by 
the lack of an open discussion on the building of such models.
The formal approaches of causal models elaborated by Spirtes, 
Pearl and many others offers a normative account of reasoning with 
causes and probabilities, providing principles for representing and 
6 H. Kincaid (2011: 73) distinguishes between vertical mechanisms, i.e. ‘the 
component processes realizing some higher level capacities’, and horizontal mecha-
nisms, sets of ‘intervening or mediating variables between a putative cause and its 
effect’. The latter are called ‘horizontal’ because the intervening or mediating 
variables are at the same level as the putative causal relata. My ‘causal structures’ 
are ‘horizontal’ in the sense specified by Kincaid. See also Kincaid 2012.
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
8 For example, Alberti et al. (2005: 1060) state that ‘Central obesity, was 
agreed as essential […] because of the strength of the evidence linking waist cir-
cumference with cardiovascular disease and the other metabolic syndrome com-
ponents, and the likelihood that central obesity is an early step in the aetiological 
cascade leading to full metabolic Syndrome’. Here central obesity is seen as a 
cause of ‘full MetS’ due to statistical and chronological considerations.
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inferring causal relations. The causal structure of the phenomenon 
under investigation is represented by means of a causal diagram, a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG), in which nodes associated to variables 
are connected by arrows, where the direction of the arrows repre-
sents the direction of the causal relationship. A is a ‘direct cause’ of 
B if there is an arrow going from node A to node B. Causal diagrams 
assume an underlying causal structure; however, when a probability 
distribution is associated to a DAG, the graph can have both a causal 
and a probabilistic interpretation. The theory of causal modelling 
offers important directions for the selection of sets of possible causal 
structures from a set of statistical associations. However, as is well 
known, statistical data and DAG theory do not, per se, automatically 
reveal the causal structure of the domain, and the construction of 
causal models requires careful consideration of many other aspects, 
mainly the careful choice of the variables.
If we now review some of the main criticisms of the panellists’ 
definitions of MetS, particularly ATP III, we may verify that those 
criticisms mainly concern the choice of the set of relevant variables, 
the dependence relations between them, and the inadequacy of the 
underlying causal models. Let us give a short summary of these three 
kinds of criticisms:
(i) Choice of variables
Shahar (2010) criticizes pannelists’ definitions of MetS on the basis of 
methodological considerations. He distinguishes between natural vari-
ables (like height, weight, and fasting glucose levels) and derived vari-
ables (like body mass index, or ‘diabetes status’). While natural vari-
ables have been created by nature and ‘we just try to measure those 
values’, artificial variables are human-made. We derive their value by 
means of arithmetical formulas, or conditional statements such as ‘If 
fasting glucose is < C, then [the value of] ‘diabetes status’ is ‘no diabe-
tes’’. (see Shahar 2010: 773) According to Shahar, in the pannellists’ 
definitions ‘MetS status’ is a derived variable. He points out that they all 
conform to a standard format, represented by the following algorithm
Let V1, V2, …, Vn, denote a set of n continuous variables, either natural or 
derived. For each variable, decide on a cut-off point and derive a binary 
variable (0,1) on the basis of that cut-off point and a conditional. Next, add 
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up the values of these binary variable to derive a summation variable, say 
SUM. Finally, derive ‘metabolic syndrome status’ from SUM, using a cut-
off point and a conditional: if SUM < k, then the metabolic syndrome is 
absent; otherwise, the metabolic syndrome is present (Shahar 2010: 773).
Shahar emphasizes that definitions based on derived variables have 
limited epistemic import. Derived variables exist in the trivial sense 
that ‘we create them from some other variables’, but this does not 
implies that a derived variable has any empirical counterpart with 
genuine causal capacities. Furthermore, in the panellists’ definitions 
the statistical associations among the derived variables remain unex-
plained, as the definitions do not mention any causal relation among 
derived variables or any common cause. Using DAGs, Shahar shows 
that definitions obtained according to the algorithm quoted above 
are too weak, as they are compatible with different causal structures 
and do not allow to exclude spurious causal relations.
Further criticisms raised by Shahar are shared by other authors. 
Overall, they focus on four weak points in the panellists’ definitions 
concerning the choice of variables:
(a) Non-homogeneity—The various definitions of MetS refer to 
different sets of variables, as discussed above.
(b) Lack of upper cut-off limits—Since all of the syndrome variables 
have no upper cut-off limits, Kahn (2006) suggests that many 
individuals will be so diagnosed because they have frank dia-
betes, hypertension, or severe lipid abnormalities.
(c) Inappropriate dichotomising of variables—Reaven (2006) under-
lines how this aspect, together with the previous one, may 
have paradoxical consequences. Kahn (2006) is also con-
cerned about how the label of MetS can be misleading to both 
the physician and the patient.9 The arbitrariness of the con-
9 His rhetorical remark is worth quoting in full: ‘Labelling a person with 
the metabolic syndrome can be very misleading to the physician and the patient. 
The syndrome is defined by dichotomizing continuous variables and providing no 
upper limits to any of them. Thus, a person who has an FPG of 105 mg/dl and 
a systolic blood pressure of 130 mmHg and is only slightly overweight would be 
classified as having the syndrome. Meanwhile, another person with uncontrolled 
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struction of binary variables is also stressed by Shahar (2010).
(d) Incompleteness of the model—Kahn et al. (2005) underline the 
arbitrary exclusion of some well-known risk factors for CVD, 
such as physical inactivity, family history, sex, and age.
(ii) Dependence relations between variables
Most criticisms are based on the claim that the panellists’ definitions 
do not adequately match the causal relations among variables and, 
consequently, do not constitute a useful tool for diagnosis or treat-
ment. The best example is given by the lack of a clear causal role 
played by obesity. I will discuss this aspect in section 3.2.
(iii) Causal inadequacy of the model
Given that the structure of causal relations of MetS is not defined 
or clear, we are left with a high degree of uncertainty as to which 
variables need to be intervened upon and whether the treatment of 
the syndrome must be something different from the individual treat-
ment of the component variables. Common opinion is that at least 
some elements of MetS (e.g. dislipidaemia and hypertension) should 
be treated in any case. Perhaps, given the (causal) darkness of MetS, 
we should not be surprised that the only treatment actually shared 
from the various definitions seems to be the joint recommendation 
of a healthy diet and physical activity. We do not need MetS for that.
Eventually, a diagnosis of MetS according to the ATP III criteria 
could lead to neglecting a diagnosis of insulin resistance. In that case, 
the definition might lose even that minimal utility that was suggested 
at point (c) of paragraph 2.1. From a clinical point of view, such an 
approach increases the risk of leading to an over-evaluation of the 
harmful potential of some factors and to an under-evaluation of the 
danger of others. On the basis of these considerations, and of those 
expressed by ADA/EASD quoted above, the presumed pedagogical 
diabetes, a systolic blood pressure of 165 mmHg, and morbid obesity would also 
be classified as having metabolic syndrome. Are both individuals at similar risk 
for a future myocardial infarction or stroke? What if the first person had an LDL 
cholesterol of 75 mg/dl, was 40 years of age, was female, and had no family his-
tory of CVD?’ (Kahn 2006: 1695).
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utility of MetS in promoting a healthier lifestyle also loses plausibility.
I tried to show how we can associate a causal content also to pan-
ellists’ definitions of MetS, although the outlines of the associated 
causal models are not up to standards: they point to causal structures 
that do not work properly or are not well devised. Better awareness 
of how to build models could help avoid part of the confusion or 
vagueness linked to the definition of MetS. However, we may doubt 
whether the causal content of these models could have been sufficient.
The remaining part of this work is devoted to the third kind of 
definition, associated with a pathophysiological mechanism. I will 
also argue that Reaven’s account of the syndrome is particularly well 
suited to a rational reconstruction in terms of natural kinds.
3 Kinds of syndromes
In what follows, I suggest that the differences of approach between 
‘the panellists’ view’ and Reaven’s view can be partly clarified with 
the help of the philosophical research on natural kinds (see, for in-
stance, Boyd 1991, 1999; Craver 2009). After a short survey of dif-
ferent kinds of ‘natural kinds’, I will direct attention back to Reaven’s 
view and his criticism of the panellists’ theories in order to defend the 
explicative value of a highly detailed causal definition of the syndrome.
3.1 Kinds of kinds
I will take the route suggested by Kendler et al. (2011). The authors 
start from the question ‘What kinds of things are psychiatric disor-
ders?’ and examine four groupings of things, namely essentialist kinds, 
socially constructed kinds, practically constructed kinds, and mechanistic 
property clusters. As the partition proves very useful in reflecting on 
MetS, I will describe briefly the four kinds and assess their respec-
tive merits as candidates for rational reconstructions of MetS.
Essentialist kinds—Essentialist kinds are characterised by the fact 
that they exist independently of our minds and by having essences. 
Kendler et al. (2011: 1144) define essences as ‘sets of features neces-
sary and sufficient for something to count as a member of that kind 
and for which many identifying characteristics of that kind arise’. 
Essentialist kinds are therefore characterised by an emphasis on a 
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single, well-defined aetiological agent, although this agent can be 
provisionally unknown.
If we look for ‘these kinds of things’ in medicine, we find that tu-
berculosis infection is a plausible candidate (due to its close link with 
the Mycobacterium Tuberculosis); another plausible candidate is Down 
syndrome, given that the trisomy of chromosome 21 is considered 
a necessary and sufficient condition for it. When we compare MetS 
with these diseases, it is apparent that neither in Reaven’s nor in other 
definitions of MetS can we find the cause, intended as the sufficient 
and necessary condition, of CVD or T2D and other pathologies.
We could ask whether insulin resistance is ‘the essence’ of Reav-
en’s Syndrome X. Actually, Syndrome X has, with insulin resistance, 
a unifying factor, which is a necessary condition for the syndrome, 
but insulin resistance it is not a sufficient condition, because, as we 
saw in section 1.1, it must be associated with other factors to pro-
duce an increased risk of CVD or T2D.
We can conclude that neither Syndrome X nor MetS is an essen-
tial kind. However, in Reaven’s version, the syndrome is clearly con-
sidered an entity that exists independently of our descriptions and 
not a conventional construction. Moreover, the efforts to ascertain 
a ‘unitary framework’, in Reaven’s words, or a ‘real definition’, in 
Federspil’s words, show a certain ‘closeness’ with essentialist kinds.
Socially constructed kinds—According to a constructionist point of 
view, pathological kinds do not exist independently of the human 
mind, but they are the product of categorisation or classification by 
specific societies or by the prevailing culture in different historical 
periods. Given the ubiquity of the expression ‘metabolic syndrome’ 
in the media and its connections with different definitions (or no 
definition at all) and the contemporary lifestyle, it would be difficult 
to deny that the notion of MetS also has a cultural significance. How-
ever, it seems unlikely that an account of the syndrome in terms of 
social practices can actually cover the whole set of problems linked 
to the definition of MetS.
Practical kinds—Treating natural categories as practical kinds 
amounts to considering them as tools or instruments for the achieve-
ment of practical goals. Accordingly, they should be evaluated 
by their practical success, without asking if they are real or what 
are their true essences. With regard to MetS, at least some of the 
Margherita Benzi572
conventionalist approaches fit in this category. The clearest case is 
the WHO definition, in which the clustering anomalies are simply 
listed, and no criterion of importance or of strength of association 
is dictated. The underlying view of this definition is that controlling 
some well-known risk factors can prevent some major diseases, even 
if their causes remain unknown, and that it is important to provide 
physicians with a practical diagnostic tool. We have already com-
mented on the shortcomings of this perspective in section 2.2.
Mechanistic property clusters—A different notion of natural kind is 
the notion of homeostatic property cluster, introduced by Boyd (1991) to 
describe biological species. Under this view kinds are not the prod-
uct of human constructions or conventions; rather, their definition is 
specified a posteriori by a set or a cluster of properties whose posses-
sion is due to the causal structure of the external world (homeostatic 
property cluster ). The most important traits of homeostatic property 
clusters are the following:
(i) there is a family F of properties that co-occur in a relevant 
number of cases;
(ii) either the presence of some of the properties in F tends to be 
associated with the presence of the others, or there are un-
derlying mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain both;
(iii) the conjoint occurrence of all, or many of the properties in 
question, together with the underlying mechanism(s) pro-
duces important effects;
(iv) ‘imperfect’ (incomplete) mechanisms are possible; and 
(v) in many cases, the classifications as a specific property cluster 
will be indeterminate (Boyd 1999: 144).
An application of these ideas to medicine is suggested by Kendler et al 
(2011), who analyse psychiatric syndromes in terms of their property 
clusters, rather than in terms of their essences or as social constructs. 
They also propose to substitute the term ‘homeostatic property clus-
ter’ with the more informative ‘mechanistic property cluster’. I agree 
with them on this point, and from now on I will use their terminology.
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The definition of the syndrome proposed by Reaven in 1988, and 
its subsequent refinements, meets—at least partially—the defining 
criteria for mechanistic property clusters. The co-occurring pheno-
typic traits listed by the definition share the property of being parts 
of a unique pathophysiological mechanism. This mechanism is con-
stituted by the totality of the causal influences exerted by insulin 
resistance on the other components and, in some cases, by the causal 
influences of some components on the others. The occurrence of the 
components of the syndrome and the underlying mechanism has the 
conjoint effect of increasing the risk of further pathologies. As quot-
ed above, Reaven (1988: 1606) admits that not all the components 
of the syndrome must be present; moreover, as we have seen, the 
family of the components was enlarged in subsequent refinements of 
the original definition, as IR syndrome.
We have already analysed how some of the panellists’ definitions 
were grounded on stable co-occurrences of properties that bring 
about important effects, and could therefore be associated to implicit 
causal models. The true difference between Reaven’s approach and 
the panellists’ approach lies in the fact that the former has a precise 
hypothesis about the causal mechanism underlying the syndrome. 
This hypothesis guides the criteria for inclusion or exclusion of vari-
ables that enter the definition and the choice of the most plausible 
causal relations between variables.
3.2 Kinds of evidence
According to our rough classification of definitions, Reaven’s IR syn-
drome appears to imply a definition at a high level of causal specifi-
cation. In the pathophysiological framework suggested by Reaven, 
everything is connected, even if not everything is explained; insulin 
resistance, the fundamental explicative factor, is not.
To explain the different links that connect the components of IR 
syndrome with related pathologies, Reaven always produces statis-
tical evidence and, sometimes, mechanistic evidence. Both kinds 
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of evidence are produced for T2D,10 Polycystic Ovary Syndrome,11 
CVD,12 and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease.13
Only statistical evidence is produced for essential hypertension, 
different kinds of cancer, and obstructive sleep apnea. For instance, 
concerning the latter, Reaven refers to studies that seem to show 
that the frequency of obstructive sleep apnea among obese patients 
who are insulin resistant or hyperinsulinemic is greater than among 
equally obese patients without insulin resistance /hyperinsulinemia. 
Moreover, insulin resistance has been found in non-obese persons 
with obstructive sleep apnea. In this case, evidence is not conclusive, 
but the model is open: 
This area of clinical investigation is just beginning, and it is premature to 
decide if obstructive sleep apnea is simply more likely to occur for mechan-
ical reasons in obese individuals and insulin resistance represents an epi-
10 ‘Type 2 diabetes only occurs when insulin-resistant individuals are no lon-
ger able to maintain the degree of compensatory hyperinsulinemia needed to 
maintain normal glucose homeostasis’ (Reaven 2004: 287).
11 ‘PCOS is another example in which adverse consequences of muscle and 
adipose tissue insulin resistance are caused by the associated hyperinsulinemia 
acting on normally insulin sensitive tissues In this instance, it seems that the 
clinical features of PCOS result from an increase in testosterone secretion by 
ovaries that are at least normally insulin sensitive, secondary to the higher insulin 
concentrations’ (Reaven 2004: 289).
12 ‘Values of insulin-mediated glucose disposal vary continuously throughout 
a population of apparently healthy persons, and a difference of ³ 600% exists 
between the most insulin-sensitive and the most insulin-resistant persons. Ap-
proximately 50% of this variability can be attributed to differences in adipos-
ity (25%) and fitness (25%), with the remaining 50% likely of genetic origin. 
The more insulin-resistant a person, the more likely that he or she will develop 
some degree of glucose intolerance, high triacylglycerol and low HDL concentra-
tions, essential hypertension, and procoagulant and proinflammatory states, all 
of which increase the risk of cardiovascular disease’ (Reaven 2006: 1237).
13 ‘Resistance to insulin action at the level of the muscle and adipose tissue 
results in daylong increases in circulating plasma insulin and free fatty acid con-
centrations, which lead to increased hepatic triglyceride synthesis. If the rate at 
which the liver is able to incorporate the newly synthesized triglyceride into very 
low density lipoprotein and secrete it as very low density lipoprotein-triglyceride 
lags behind the liver’s synthesis of triglyceride, the result is an increase in hepatic 
fat content’ (Reaven 2004: 289).
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phenomenon, or if insulin resistance/hyperinsulinemia may play a causal 
role in the genesis of sleep-disordered breathing (Reaven 2004: 291).
It is on the ground of mechanistic considerations that obesity is not 
included in Syndrome X or IR syndrome. As we have seen, abdomi-
nal obesity is present with different degrees of relevance and differ-
ent denominations (‘waist-to-hip ratio’, ‘waist circumference’, ‘cen-
tral obesity’) in many definitions of MetS, but it is absent in Reaven’s 
definition. When Reaven proposed his Syndrome X, he was well 
aware that obesity was a risk factor for CVD and T2D; however, 
his exclusion of (abdominal) obesity ‘was not an oversight’ (Reaven 
2011: 129). His account of the syndrome implied that the adiposity 
criteria included in the panellists’ definition was qualitatively differ-
ent from the other components, as the association of adiposity with 
the components is not direct, but rather due to the fact that excess 
adiposity increases the likelihood that a person will be insulin resis-
tant (Reaven 2006: 1241).
In the same article, Reaven quotes a statistical study (Ninomiya et 
al. 2004) showing that abdominal adiposity is also not directly associ-
ated to CVD or stroke (and therefore its causal influence on these 
diseases should be mediated by other components of the syndrome). 
Obesity is a cause of insulin resistance, and its influence on both the 
components of Syndrome X and CVD is mediated by insulin resis-
tance. For these reasons, it should be excluded from the cluster of 
factors composing Syndrome X or IR syndrome.
From an epistemic point of view, the characterisation of the syn-
drome as a mechanistic property cluster offers several advantages. 
Firstly, it allows one to see the mechanism underlying the syndrome 
as a component of a wider mechanism (for instance, of a mechanism 
including both adiposity, which is split from the components of Syn-
drome X but interacts with them) and the components of the syn-
drome. Secondly, it allows one to carefully distinguish the pathophys-
iological level of analysis from other levels, such as environmental 
stress, the gene level, and so on; a multilevel analysis aims to integrate 
different levels of explanation without obliterating the differences.
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3.3 Different names, different concepts, and different goals?
As it should now be clear, from a conceptual viewpoint the defini-
tion of Reaven’s IR syndrome—with his previous Syndrome X—is 
deeply different from the definitions of MetS. In the already quoted 
essay ‘The Metabolic Syndrome or the Insulin Resistance Syndrome? 
Different Names, Different Concepts, and Different Goals’, Reaven 
(2004) underlines the difference between his approach and the ap-
proach of the panellists in defining MetS. His aim is to produce a 
conceptual framework in which to insert risk factors that are strong-
ly associated with a set of clinical manifestations.
The primary goal of IR syndrome is therefore more explanatory 
than diagnostic. However, this pre-eminence of the explanatory goal 
does not imply that IR syndrome is useless from a clinical point of 
view, given that it may help to pinpoint ‘mechanistic targets’ with 
which to evaluate new treatments. MetS, on the contrary, is intend-
ed as a clinical tool and has to be evaluated in this respect. Reaven 
admits that, from this perspective, it could be reasonable to include 
obesity among the components of MetS; however, this choice is un-
satisfactory because there is no general agreement on a shared and 
truly useful measure of obesity. Besides, as we have seen in section 
2.1, the usefulness of MetS is strongly doubted because of its inability 
to identify and unambiguously select the class of ‘patients’ to which 
it should apply.
Conclusions
Federspil et al. (2006: 451) wrote: ‘the debate about the definition 
of MetS continues at present, yet we believe that there is little hope 
of finding true agreement unless we stop to reflect on the basic con-
cepts from a methodological point of view’. Ten years later, the con-
troversy is still open, and recent work seems to confirm that the 
final explanation of the syndrome, if we ever will have one, will 
be extremely complicated, with intertwining mechanisms, loops, 
and ramifications. It is also plausible that the explanation will ben-
efit from the contributions of massive amounts of clinical data, data 
regarding disease gene networks, human disease networks, and still 
others (e.g. see Kraja et al. 2008).
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My suggestion is that the recent advances in the theory of natural 
kinds can contribute to the methodological reflection, and, basically, 
that an analysis of the causal content of the different definitions may 
help to sort the range and limits of their application. Specifically, the 
controversy over MetS presents an illustration of how a unique tag 
has been applied to different definitions, built with different aims 
and with different principles, dealing with different levels of causal-
ity. These differences, however, do not imply a complete indepen-
dence of the definitions.
First, our analysis suggests that type 1 definitions not only do not 
explain why certain people have a stronger risk of getting CVD or 
T2D, but also have a limited value in determining which people have 
the stronger risk.
Second, if we compare type 2 definitions (and causal models such 
as Bayesian Networks) with a mechanistic hypothesis like that of Reav-
en, we see that the latter has at least the heuristic capacity to guide the 
scientist’s choice of the relevant variables and the detection of causal 
dependencies between them, narrowing the set of plausible DAGs.
As a conclusion, although different definitions may be used with 
different purposes, the hypothesis of a model with highly specified 
causal content such as a mechanistic property cluster, (that we have 
seen implemented in Reaven’s work) may be used as a blueprint that 
helps clarifying the scope and limits of other kinds of definitions14.
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